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Abst ract  
The present study examines • range of moral issues asso- 
ciated with recent cyberstalking cases. Particular atten- 
tion is centered on the Amy Boyer/Liam Youens case of 
cyberstalking, which raises a host of considerations that 
we believe have a significant impact for ethical behavior 
on the Internet. Among the questions we consider are 
those having to do with personal privacy and the use of 
certain kinds of Internet search facilities to stalk indi- 
viduals in cyberspace. Also considered are questions hav- 
ing to do with legal liability and (possible) moral re- 
sponsibility that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have 
for stalking crimes that occur in their %pace" on the 
Internet. Finall~ we examine issues of moral responsi- 
bility for individual online users to determine which ob- 
ligations, if any, they might have to inform persons who 
are targeted by cyberstalkers, when it is in their power 
tO do so. 
Keywords  
Cyberstalking, personal privacy, search engines, ISPs, 
moral responsibility, and duty to assist 
1. INTRODUCTION: STALKING ACTIVITIES 
IN CYBERSPACE 
What  exactly is cyberstalking, and how exactly do 
stalking incidents in cyberspace raise concerns for eth- 
ics? In answering these quest ions,  we begin with a 
definition of stalking in general. According to Webster's 
New World Dictionary of the American Language, one 
definit ion of stalking is ~to pursue or approach game, 
an enemy, etc. stealthily, as f rom cover." In an ex- 
tended sense of stalking, as appl ied to cr iminal  ac- 
tivities involving human beings, a "stalking activity" 
has come to be associated with one individual  ("the 
stalker ~) c landest inely t rack ing the movement  and 
whereabouts of an another individual  or individuals 
("the stalkee[s]~). 
Cyberstalking can be understood as a form of behav- 
ior in which certain types of  stalking-related activi- 
ties, which in the past have occurred in physical space, 
are extended to the onl ine world. On  the one hand, 
we do not wish to claim that cyberstalking is a new 
kind of crime or that it is a "genuine computer crime" 
(see Tavani, 2000).  On  the other hand,  we believe 
that the Internet  has made a relevant difference be- 
cause of the way stalking activities can now be carried 
out (see Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2001). For example, 
In ternet  stalkers can operate  anonymous ly  or 
pseudononymous ly  whi le  on l ine .  In add i t ion ,  a 
cyberstalker can stalk one or more individuals f rom 
the comfort of his living room, and thus not have to 
venture out into the physical world to carry out his 
task. So Internet  technology has made possible cer- 
tain modes of stalking that would not have been pos- 
sible in the pre- Internet era. 
Many people are concerned about the k ind and the 
number  of stalking-related activities that now occur 
in cyberspace. There are many reasons why these in- 
dividuals would seem justif ied in their concern. Be- 
cause stalking crimes are not fully understood in terms 
of their conceptual boundaries and their implications, 
it is that much more diff icult to understand clearly 
what it would mean to stalk someone in cyberspace. 
In the cyber-realm, for example, there are no physi- 
cal-space criteria that are strictly analogous to those 
in physical space. 
One difficulty in understanding some of the essential 
features of cyberstalking crimes is that these crimes 
sometimes border on, and thus become confused with, 
broader forms of "harassment crimes." Consider a re- 
cent inc ident  invo lv ing twenty-year  old Chr i s t ian  
Hunold ,  who was charged with terrorizing T imothy  
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McGillicuddy, principal of a high school in the US. 
Hunold constructed a Web site that included "hit lists" 
of teachers and students at the school, and a picture 
of the school that was displayed through "the cross 
hairs of a rifle". On that site, Hunold, under various 
pseudonyms, corresponded with 40 of the 215 eighth 
graders in the school. He then began to make threats 
to the victims in Massachusetts who did not know 
that they were actually dealing with a person who 
lived in Missouri ("The Web's Dark Side ~, 2000). Is 
this behavior a form of cyberstalking or is it ~harass- 
ment in cyberspace?" 
The case of Randi Barber and Gary Dellapenta illus- 
trates an incident in which the stalker himself  en- 
gaged others to stalk the intended victim in physical 
space. In 1996, Barber met Dellapenta, a security 
guard, through a friend. Although Dellapenta wanted 
a relationship with Barber, she spurned his advances. 
A few months later, Barber began to receive phone 
solicitations from men on her telephone answering 
machine; and in one case, a "solicitor ~ actually ap- 
peared at the door of her residence. Because she had 
never used a computer or had never interacted with 
the Internet, Barber had no idea how potentially dan- 
gerous her situation was. For example, Barber was 
not aware that Dellapenta had actually assumed her 
identity in various Internet chat rooms, when solicit- 
ing "kinky sex". Anonymity and pseudonymity tools, 
available to any Internet user, allowed Dellapenta to 
represent himself as Barber, via screen names such as 
a "playfulkitty4U" and "kinkygal30". His access to 
chat rooms and message boards enabled him to dis- 
seminate information about Barber to Internet users 
around the globe. Barber became aware of what was 
going on only after she asked one caller why he was 
phoning her. The caller's answer both shocked and 
frightened her. Barber's anonymous cyberstalker had 
managed to unleash a chain of threatening events with 
a few clicks of a mouse (Foote, 1999). Again, we can 
ask whether  the Barber /Del lapenta case is t ru ly 
cyberstalking instead of a more general instance of 
h ar assm en t 
Thus far we have described some particular cases that 
have been described as cyberstalking activities. We 
have also seen why, in these particular cases, it was 
difficult to separate out certain harassment activities 
(in general) from stalking behavior in particular. In 
the next section we focus our attention on a specific 
case of Internet stalking involving Amy Boyer. We will 
see why this particular case would seem to be a clear 
instance of cyberstalking. We will also see why the 
Amy Boyer case raises a range of ethical issues that are 
philosophically interesting. 
2. THE AMY BOYER CASE: SOME ETHICAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
On October 15, 1999, Amy Boyer, a twenty-year-old 
resident of Nashua, NH, was murdered by a young man 
who had stalked her via the Internet. The stalker, Liam 
Youens, was able to carry out most of the stalking activi- 
ties that eventually led to Boyer's death by using a vari- 
ety of tools available to him online. Through the use of 
standard Internet search facilities, for example, Youens 
gathered information about Boyer that was readily ac- 
cessible from databases available to online search requests. 
A series of Internet searches on the name "Amy Boyer" 
yielded several pieces of information about Boyer, which 
Youens could then piece together to track down his vic- 
tim. Through the use of certain tools available to any 
Internet user, he was able to find out where Boyer lived, 
where she worked, what kind of vehicle she drove, etc. In 
addition to using Internet search-related tools to acquire 
personal information about Boyer, Youens was also able 
to use other kinds of online tools, provided by Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs), to construct wo Web sites. On 
one site, he posted personal information about Boyer, 
including her picture, and on another the other site he 
described, in explicit detail, his plans to murder Boyer. 
The Amy Boyer case has raised a number of controversial 
questions, many of which would seem to have significant 
moral implications for cyberspace. One question at issue 
here is whether there really is anything special about 
Boyer's murder, including the stalking activities that led 
to her eventual death. In response to the Boyer inddent, 
philosophers taking a position that Deborah Johnson 
(2001) describes as the ~traditionalist" view might argue 
that there is nothing philosophically or morally interest- 
ing about cyberstalking in general, or the Amy Boyer 
case in particular. A traditionalist would point out, for 
example, that ~murder is murder," and that, unfortu- 
nately, several homicides occur each day. On this view, 
whether a murderer uses a computing device that in- 
duded Internet ools to assist in carrying out a particular 
murder would seem irrelevant; or at least it would not 
intuitively seem to be a factor that makes a qualitative 
difference in the carrying out of a crime such as homi- 
cide. A traditionalist might also take the position that 
there is nothing special about cyberstalking incidents in 
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general - -  irrespective of whether or not those incidents 
result in the death of the victims - -  since stalking activi- 
ties have had a long history of occurrence in the "off- 
line" world. On this view, the use of Internet echnology 
could be seen as simply the latest in a series of tools or 
techniques that have become available to stalkers to as- 
sist them in carrying out their criminal activities. 
Those philosophers who could be described as "unique- 
ness advocates" (see Tavani, 2001) with respect o com- 
puter ethics issues, on the other hand, would likely sug- 
gest that there are certain aspects of cyberstalking that 
raise either new or special ethical problems. Proponents 
of this view can point to a number of factors which, ei- 
ther individually or in combination, would support such 
a position. For one thing, they can point out the relative 
ease with which stalking activities can now be carried 
out in cyberspace. By simply using a computing device 
with Internet access, one can now stalk a targeted victim 
without having to leave the comfort of his or her home. 
Uniqueness advocates could then go on to point to issues 
having to do with the scope of stalking crimes that are 
now possible. Through the use of Internet technology, 
for example, an individual can stalk multiple victims si- 
multaneously through the use of multiple "windows ~on 
his computer. The stalker can also stalk victims who hap- 
pen to live in states and countries that are geographically 
distant from the stalker. Also, through the use of Internet 
technology a stalker can, as Liam Youens did, easily ac- 
quire personal information about his or her victim be- 
cause of the availability of such information that is readily 
accessible from electronic databases via online search en- 
gines. 
Uniqueness advocates can also point to issues having to 
do with the aspects of stalking having to do with the 
scale or number of stalking crimes now made possible by 
cyber-technology. For example, a stalker can roam the 
Internet anonymously, or under a certain alias (pseud- 
onym), which makes it much more difficult for law-en- 
forcement agents to track down that stalker, either be- 
fore or after the stalker has caused physical harm to his 
victim. Because of the ease of electronic stalking, indi- 
viduals who might never have considered stalking a vic- 
tim in physical space might be tempted to engage in one 
or more stalking activities in virtual space. These and 
other factors, it could be further argued, contribute to 
the possibility of stalking crimes occurring on a scale that 
would not l ikdy have been possible prior to the advent 
of the Internet. It has also been argued that cyberstalking 
activities have significant implications for a range of ethi- 
cal and social issues, ranging from those of privacy and 
securit)~ free speech and censorship to more general ques- 
tions involving moral responsibility and legal liability 
(see Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2001). 
As mentioned above, our specific concern in this section 
of the paper is with the stalking incident involving Amy 
Boyer and with particular ethical questions that the case 
raises. For example, was Boyer's right to (or at least her 
expectations about) privacy violated because of the per- 
sonal information about her that was made available so 
easily to Internet users such as Liana Youens? Did Youens 
have a "right" to set up a dedicated Web site about Amy 
Boyer without Boyer's knowledge and express consent; 
and did Youens have a right to post on that Web site any 
kind of information about Boyer - -  regardless of whether 
that information about her was psychologically harmful, 
offensive, or defamatory? If so, is such a right one that is 
- -  or ought to be - -  protected by free speech? Should 
the two ISPs that enabled Youens to post such informa- 
tion to Web sites that reside in their Internet "space" be 
held legally liable, especially when information contained 
on those sites can easily lead to someone's being physi- 
cally harmed or, as in the case of Amy Boyer, murdered? 
Furthermore, do ordinary users who happen to come 
across a Web site that contains a posting of a death threat 
directed at an individual or group of individuals have a 
moral responsibility to inform those individuals whose 
lives are threatened? These kinds of questions are among 
those which suggest hat there may indeed be something 
special about the Amy Boyer case (as well as for 
cyberstalking activities in general) that are worthy of fur- 
ther examination from a moral point of analysis. 
Although each of the issues briefly described in the pre- 
ceding paragraph ave significant ethical implications, 
and while each might deserve deeper philosophical analy- 
sis, we will limit our discussion in this section of  our 
paper to three ethical concerns involving the Amy Boyer 
case. First, we consider the issue of threats posed to po- 
tential cyberstalking victims because of the unrestricted 
use of Internet search engines. We then consider ques- 
tions of  legal l iabil ity and moral responsibi l i ty in 
cyberstalking incidents for Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs). Finally, we consider the role of individual moral 
responsibility for Internet users who find themselves in a 
position to inform a fellow user that she is being stalked. 
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3. INTERNET SEARCH ENGINES AND PUBLIC 
RECORDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONAL 
PRIVACY 
Few would dispute the value that Internet search en- 
gines have provided in directing us to a host of available 
online resources, which in turn have aided us locating 
useful information involving academic research, com- 
merce, recreation, and so forth. Hence, some might be 
surprised to find that search-engine technology itself 
could be controversial in some way. However, search en- 
gines can also be used to locate personal information 
about individuals. Sometimes that personal information 
resides in the form of public records that are available to 
Internet users, as in the case of information acquired about 
Amy Boyer by Liam Youens. Other types of personal 
information about individuals can also be acquired easily 
because of certain kinds of personal data that has been 
made accessible to Internet search engines without the 
knowledge and consent of the person or persons affected. 
But one might still ask why exactly the use of search- 
engine technology is controversial with respect to the 
privacy of individuals. Because an individual may be 
unaware that his or her name is among those included in 
one or more databases accessible to search engines, indi- 
viduals have little control over how information about 
them can be made available and be disseminated across 
the Internet (see Tavani, 1997). This was certainly the 
case in the incident involving Amy Boyer, who had no 
knowledge about or control over the ways in which cer- 
tain kinds of personal information about her was acces- 
sible to Youens through Internet search engines - -  for 
Boyer neither placed any personal information about 
herself on the Internet, nor was she aware that such in- 
formation about her had been so placed. 
It could be argued that all information currently avail- 
able on the Internet, including information about indi- 
vidual persons such as Amy Boyer, is, by virtue of the 
fact that it resides on the Internet, public information. 
We can, of course, question whether all of the informa- 
tion currently available on the Internet should be viewed 
as public information. And, if the answer to that ques- 
tion is "yes," then should certain kinds of "public infor- 
mation," viz., public records that contain personal infor- 
mation, be treated merely as public data or as data that 
might deserve some kind of normative protection? 
Because of concerns related to the easy flow of personal 
information between and across databases, certain laws 
have been enacted and some policies established to set 
limits on the ways in which electronic records contain- 
ing confidential or intimate data can be exchanged. How- 
ever, these laws and policies typically apply only to the 
exchange of dectronic information such as that contained 
in medical records and f inancial records. Helen 
Nissenbaum (1998) has pointed out that such protec- 
tion does not apply to personal information in the pub- 
lic sphere or in what she describes as "spheres other than 
the intimate." Unfortunately for Amy Boyer, the kind of 
information that was gathered about her by Youens would 
be considered non-intimate and non-confidential in na- 
ture and thus would likely be viewed, by default, as "pub- 
lic ~ in nature. Is this presumption about how personal 
information involving public records is currently viewed 
one that it is either reasonable or fair? Was it fair to Amy 
Boyer? 
What exactly should the status of personal information 
that resides in public records that now are accessible to 
everyone be with respect o privacy policies and laws? In 
particular, what should the privacy status of this kind of 
information be in the Internet age? It could be noted 
that in the era preceding the Internet, information of 
this particular kind could have been acquired by indi- 
viduals willing to go to certain municipal buildings to 
request hardcopy versions of public records that contained 
personal information about various individuals. Of  course, 
individuals requesting such information would have had 
to physically travel to the municipal building where the 
information they desired was housed, and those indi- 
viduals would have probably been charged a small fee for 
any records they obtained. I f  this kind of information 
about persons was already public before the advent of 
cyber-technology, why should ira status necessarily change 
because of the new technology? Perhaps an equally im- 
portant question that could be asked as an alternative to 
the original question is: Why were such records made 
public in the first place? For example, were they made 
public so that online entrepreneurs like Docusearch.com 
could collect this information, combine it with other kinds 
of personal information, and then sell it for a profit? Of  
course, it could be argued that entrepreneurs who were 
so motivated could have engaged in this ac t iv i ty -  and 
some, no doubt, did - -  in the era preceding the Internet. 
But we could respond by asking how profitable and how 
practical would such an enterprise have been? 
First, consider that "information merchants ~ would have 
had to purchase the physical records (that were publicly 
available). These merchants would then have had to hire 
legions of clerks to convert the purchased ata into dec- 
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tronic form, sort the data according to some scheme, and 
finally prepare it for sale. This process, in addition to 
being highly impractical in terms of certain physical re- 
quirements, would hardly have been a profitable venture 
given the amount of labor and cost involved. So, most 
likely, it would not have occurred to entrepreneurs to
engage in such a business venture prior to the advent of 
sophisticated information technology. But again, we 
should ask why public records, including records that 
contained personal information about individuals, were 
made ~public ~in the first place. 
In order for governmental gencies at the local, state, 
and federal evels to operate fficiently, records of certain 
kinds of personal information were needed to be readily 
available for access. For example, municipal governments 
needed certain information for tax-assessment purposes, 
such as assessing tax rates for houses and commercial real 
estate. State governments needed information about 
motor vehicles registered in a particular state as well as 
information about the residents of that state that are li- 
censed to drive those vehicles. And federal governments 
needed relevant information as well. Those records had 
to be accessible to governmental gencies at various lev- 
els and had to be able to be transferred and exchanged 
relatively easily. Since the records in question contained 
personal information that was generally considered to be 
neither confidential nor intimate, there were good rea- 
sons to declare them ~public records." It was assumed 
that no harm could come to individuals because of the 
availability of those public records, and it was believed 
that communities would be better served because of the 
access and flow of those records for purposes that seemed 
to be legitimate. But certain factors have changed sig- 
nificantly. Information-gathering companies now access 
those public records, manipulate the records in certain 
ways, and then sell that information to third parties. Was 
this the original intent for making such information ac- 
cessible to the public? 
It is perhaps interesting to note that there is now an 
assumption on the part of some in the commercial sector 
that because certain records are public, and because the 
Internet is a public space, all public recorek ought to be made 
available online. According to this line of reasoning, it is 
not only desirable (for those entrepreneurs) that many 
records have, as a matter of fact, been electronically con- 
verted and placed online, but rather that there is also 
some kind of legal mandate to place all public records 
online. One presumption here might be based on our 
alleged right to know what the government is up to (based 
on the notion of freedom of information) or to ensure 
that public information flows freely. However, there have 
now been several cases in which operating on such a pre- 
sumption has caused outrage on the part of many citi- 
zens, as well as harm to some, which in the case of Amy 
Boyer resulted in death. So perhaps we should rethink 
our criteria for what can count as "public records" and 
for which kinds of personal information should be made 
publicly available. We should also perhaps develop spe- 
cific policies regarding the use of search engines with 
respect o which kinds of personal information should 
be made available to them. 
If Youens had to track down Amy Boyer without the aid 
of Internet search facilities, would it have made a differ- 
ence? Would he have gone to the relevant municipal 
building to acquire information about Boyer (or would 
he possibly have hired a private detective to do so)? If 
Youcns himself had gone to the municipal building, 
would it have been possible that someone, for example a 
clerk in one of the offices, might have noticed that Youens 
was behaving strangdy? If so, would such an observation 
have prompted the clerk to notify his or her supervisor or 
possibly even the police? And would such an action, in 
turn, possibly have hdped to avoid the tragic outcome of 
the Boyer case? Of  course, these kinds of questions are 
each speculative in nature. And because we are focusing 
here on the Boyer incident, it is difficult to say what the 
answers to these questions would mean in a broader sense 
with regard to cyberstalking and to the easy access of 
public records. But these questions do give us some pause, 
and they may force us to reconsider our current beliefs 
about the public vs. private realm of personal informa- 
tion. These questions also cause us to consider the need 
for implementing explicit policies with regard to use of 
Internet search engines in the retrieval of personal infor- 
mation. It is in these senses, then, that the Amy Boyer 
incident raises for us some more general concerns about 
personal privacy on the Internet, especially in light of 
the absence of an explicit policy regarding online search 
facilities and personal information. 
So what can we conclude so far with respect to Amy 
Boyer's rights and expectations regarding privacy? Was 
her privacy violated; and if so, in what sense? Amy Boyer's 
stepfather, Tim Remsberg, believes that his stepdaughter's 
privacy was indeed violated. He has appeared before con- 
gressional groups and has influenced those in congress to 
sponsor legislation that would make it illegal to sell the 
social security numbers of one or mote individuals as a 
part of online commercial transactions. Remsberg has 
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also sued Docusearch.com, the online company that pro- 
vided Youens with information about where Boyer lived 
and worked. Additionally, Remsberg has filed a wrong- 
ful death suit against Tripod and Geocities, the two ISPs 
that hosted the Web sites that Youens set up about Boyer. 
This brings us to our second principal ethical question 
for consideration i  the Boyer case, viz., whether ISPs 
should be held morally responsible for the harm (psy- 
chological as well as physical) that results from the con- 
tent included on certain Web sites that they happen to 
host. 
4. INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS: 
QUESTIONS OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
LEGAL LIABILITY 
As noted earlier, Youens set up two Web sites about Amy 
Boyer: one containing descriptive information about 
Boyer, as well as a picture of her, and another on which 
he described in detail his plans to murder Boyer. To what 
extent, if any, either legally or morally or both, should 
the ISPs that hosted the Web sites created by Youens be 
held responsible? This question is one which is very com- 
plicated and which would benefit from being broken 
down into several shorter questions. To answer the larger 
question at issue, for example, we first need to under- 
stand what is meant by "responsibility" in both its legal 
and moral senses. We also have to consider whether we 
can attribute moral blame (or praise) to an organization 
or collectivity (of individuals), such as an ISP. We begin 
with a brief description of some current thinking on the 
role of responsibility involving ISPs, including a brief 
analysis of recent laws as well as some recent court chal- 
lenges to those laws. 
Deborah Johnson (2001) provides an excellent overview 
of background issues involving questions of accountabil- 
ity and responsibility as they pertain to ISPs. So there is 
no need for us to repeat that discussion here. We will 
however, comment on certain points, elaborated upon in 
much more detail in Johnson's exposition, which are es- 
pecially relevant o our analysis of the Amy Boyer case. 
In the 1995 case of Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services 
Company, a court found that Prodigy could be held le- 
gally liable since it had advertised that it had *'editorial 
control" over the computer bulletin board system (BBS) 
it hosted. In the eyes of the court, Prodigy's claim to 
have editorial control over its BBS made that ISP seem 
much like a newspaper, in which case the standard of 
strict legal liability used for original publishers could be 
applied. In light of the case involving Prodig~ many ISPs 
have since argued that they should not be understood as 
"original publishers," but rather as ~common carriers," 
similar in relevant respects to telephone companies. Their 
argument for this view rested in part on the notion that 
ISPs provide the "conduits for communication but not 
the content." This view of ISPs would be used in later 
court decisions. 
In Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA), the role of ISPs was interpreted in such a way 
that would appear to protect ISPs from lawsuits similar 
to the one filed against Prodigy. Here the court specifi- 
cally stated, ~No provider or user of an interactive com- 
puter service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker 
of any information provided by another information con- 
tent provider." Although CDA was overturned by a court 
in Philadelphia, and was eventually struck down by the 
US Supreme Court, Section 230 of that ACT has re- 
mained in tact. (Some have since referred to this policy 
as the "Good Samaritan immunity for ISPs. ~) While ISPs 
are not legally liable for the content of their Web sites or 
for the content of other electronic forums that they also 
might host - -  e.g., forums such as bulletin boards and 
list servers - -  they have nonetheless been encouraged to 
monitor and filter, to the extent that they can, the con- 
tent of these sites and their electronic forums. 
In the preceding paragraph we focused primarily on the 
legal aspect of responsibility or accountability of ISPs, 
with particular attention to strict liability laws. We saw 
that from a legal point of view, ISPs are currently im- 
mune from prosecution for the content hat can be in- 
cluded on the Web sites and in the other electronic fo- 
rums that they host. However, we have not yet consid- 
ered whether ISPs might be held morally accountability, 
irrespective of the recent court rulings on the legal status 
of this matter. Deborah Johnson (2001) has noted that 
while it might be easier to make a utilitarian case for why 
ISPs could be held legally liable for certain content, it 
would be much more difficult to make the case that ISPs 
should be morally responsible for the behavior of their 
customers. Anton Vedder (2001) has recently advanced 
an argument for why we should consider holding ISPs 
morally responsible, as well as legally liable, for harm 
caused to individuals. 
Although we will not do justice to Vedder's argument in 
the space provided to it in this paper, we will attempt o 
reconstruct certain aspects of his overall argument in a 
way that reveals certain controversial points that are sa- 
lient in the Boyer case. Essentially, Vedder argues that in 
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order to understand more clearly the issues at stake in 
this dispute over ISP responsibility, we have to distin- 
guish between two senses of moral responsibility: pro- 
spective and retrospective responsibility. While the latter 
sense of responsibility is one that is often viewed as "back- 
ward looking," the former is sometimes described as "for- 
ward looking." Vedder admits, however, that this dis- 
tinction is not always as clear and unambiguous as its 
proponents uggest. For example, Vedder points out that 
it is difficult to hold someone responsible for an act X in 
a retrospective s nse if that person were not also respon- 
sible for act X in some prospective sense as well. None- 
theless, Vedder believes that this distinction is useful in 
helping us to understand the relevant aspects of moral 
responsibility necessary to frame an argument in which 
moral responsibility for harm can plausibly be said to 
apply to ISPs. But how exactly does Vedder propose that 
such an argument be constructed? 
In the case of ISPs, the threat of legal liability can - -  
despite the fact that currently in the US it is not - -  be 
used to deter ISPs from becoming lax about "policing" 
their electronic forums to some reasonable xtent. For 
example, the threat of some form of legal liability might 
cause ISPs to monitor or filter their sites on a regular 
basis to discover controversial sites and to remove them. 
So underlying the reasoning for the application of liabil- 
ity in a legal sense to ISPs is the utilitarian notion of 
deterring harm to individuals in the future, a notion of 
responsibility that is also prospective in nature. But Vedder 
notes that we are hesitant o attribute a retrospective s nse 
of responsibility to ISPs when evaluating their moral cul- 
pability because that sense of responsibility also implies 
guilt and because the notion of guilt is usually attributed 
to individuals and not to organizations. (Guilt, as Vedder 
also notes, is more often associated with Kantian theories 
than with utilitarian theories.) Vedder then suggests that 
in some cases it would also make sense to attribute the 
notion of guilt to a collectivity (i.e., a collection of indi- 
viduals) like an ISP, as well as to individuals. This form of 
attribution of moral responsibility in the retrospective 
sense to an ISP would also make sense, from Vedder's 
view, because of the connection Vedder draws (as we dis- 
cussed above) between retrospective and prospective re- 
sponsibility. If we reconstruct Vedder's argument, the 
reasoning would proceed along lines similar to the fol- 
lowing: If collectivities (such as ISPs) can be held respon- 
sible in a prospective sense (which is the rationale at the 
basis for legal liability for ISPs), and if it makes no sense 
to hold an agent responsible for an act in a retrospective 
sense if he/she is not responsible for that act in a pro- 
spective sense as wall (as Vedder separately argues), then 
we could conclude that it is reasonable to ascribe retro- 
spective responsibility in a moral sense to ISPs. Of  course, 
Vedder's argument is far more complex and much more 
subtle with respect o important details than in the sum- 
mary account of it that we have reconstructed here. 
Let us next consider how we might apply Vedder's argu- 
ment to the case involving Amy Boyer. Should Tripod 
and Geocities, the two ISPs that enabled Lia_m Youens to 
set up his Web sites about Amy Boyer, be held morally 
responsible for the harm-  to Amy Boyer that resulted 
in her death? And should those two ISPs be held morally 
responsible, even if no legal charges (e.g., in terms of 
strict legal liability) can be brought against them? Of  
course, we could ask what would be the purpose of at- 
tributing moral responsibility to these two ISPs, if there 
were no "teeth" in the form of legal sanctions that could 
subsequently be enforced. One answer to this question, 
though admittedly an answer that might seem to some 
as one that is trivial or pointless from the vantage-point 
of law enforcement, is that doing so might cause us not 
only to distinguish moral from legal considerations in
our thinking but could also cause us to think about moral 
responsibility, both at the individual and collective lev- 
els, independent of the presence or absence of particular 
laws that might or might not apply in a specific case. For 
example, we can consider whether Tripod and Geocities 
should be excused from any sense of moral responsibility 
in the Amy Boyer case simply because these two ISPs 
cannot be found legally lizble and thus prosecuted on 
legal grounds. 
We will also consider in the following section of this es- 
say a variation of the question raised in the preceding 
paragraph. There, for example, we will consider whether 
we should automatically excuse ourselves as individuals 
from being morally responsible in a particular situation 
simply because there is an absence of a specific law obli- 
gating us to perform a certain action in that situation. 
Even if, as individuals, we would have had no legal obli- 
gation to inform Amy Boyer that a death threat involv- 
ing her had been posted on the Web, does it follow that 
we also would have no moral responsibility to do so if we 
had the ability to do so? 
So if Vedder is correct, it would seem to follow that as- 
pects of moral and legal responsibility might not be able 
to be separated as ~cleanly" as many philosophers and 
legal scholars have suggested. While Gcocities and Tri- 
pod might both be found not to be legally liable for the 
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harm caused to Amy Boyer, and even though these two 
ISPs did not deliberately cause her harm, it is not clear 
that we can conclude that both ISPs should not be held 
morally responsible in some sense for the harm that re- 
sulted to Amy Boyer. It would be plausible to assume, 
then, that: If Tripod and Geocities could be held legally 
responsible in a prospective sense of responsibility (based 
on a utilitarian notion of deterrence), and if prospective 
responsibility also implies retrospective r sponsibility (in 
which case, guilt can be assigned to a moral agent), then 
we can reasonably infer that the two ISPs in question 
might deserve at least some of the blame in a moral (even 
if not in a legal) sense for what happened to Amy Boyer. 
5. MORAL OBLIGATION AT THE LEVEL OF 
INDIVIDUALS 
Let us now take up the question of  individual moral obli- 
gation and ask, what responsibilities Internet users have 
to inform ~would-be victims" of their immanent danger 
to online stalkers? For example, if an Internet user had 
been aware of Boyer's situation, should that user have 
notified Boyer that she was being stalked? In other words, 
should that user be under a moral obligation to do so? If 
we want to be responsible, or at least caring citizens, in 
cyberspace, the answer would seem to be yes. It would 
not be morally permissible to wait for stalking activities 
to move into physical space before we took any action. 
Various proposals for controlling individual behavior in 
online society have resulted in a conflict between those 
who wish to regulate by law and those who wish to pre- 
serve the practice of sdf-regulation. Of  course, this dis- 
pute is sometimes also at the base of arguments involv- 
ing claims having to do with a "safe" social space vs. "re- 
strictive ~one. In the case of cyberstalking, should our 
duty, if we have one, to assist others be based on legal 
regulations or should it rest on grounds of individual 
moral obligation to assist others? 
What exactly is meant by ~moral obligation? ~ Histori- 
cally, philosophers have offered diverse, and sometimes 
competing, definitions of what is meant by this expres- 
sion. An Internet user consulting a dictiona~ to locate a 
colloquial definition would likely discover one similar to 
the following: ~[moral obligation is] founded on the fun- 
damental principles of right conduct rather than on le- 
galities enactment or custom" (Random House, 1973). 
Of  course, philosophers have attempted to give us far 
more rigorous definitions of ~moral obligation." An in- 
teresting question is whether our notion of moral obliga- 
tion is one that is derived from our concept of justice, or 
whether instead our sense of ~justice ~ derives from moral 
obligation. This, obviously, is a complex question and is 
one that cannot be satisfactorily discussed and answered 
in this paper. O f  course, the question of  which moral 
notion - obligation or justice - -  is more fundamental 
could help us to get a dearer sense of exactly what is at 
stake in disputes involving individual moral responsibil- 
ity. Contemporary philosophers and ethicists as diverse 
as Josef Peiper (1966), Carol Gilligan (1982), and Anton 
Vedder (2001) have explored this question. Unfortu- 
nately, in this paper we cannot consider in detail the 
various points of view that have been put forth by these 
three thinkers. Nonetheless, we will attempt o sketch 
out some of the general aspects of their arguments to 
support a view of individual moral obligation. 
Josef Pieper (1966) has argued that the concept of moral 
obligation is one that is not only "personal" but also linked 
to one's community. For Peiper, "doing good" is more 
than obeying some abstract norm (i.e., some Kantian 
abstract notion of duty and universality). Rather, it is 
about the individual's relationship to other individuals 
and to the community itself. Carol Gilligan (1982) first 
proposed a position similar to Peiper's in a theory of femi- 
nist ethics. Both Pieper and Gilligan suggest hat justice 
is a complex concept hat goes far beyond the notion of 
an individual simply obeying laws. Instead, justice in- 
volves the relationship of individuals, including their in- 
dividual moral obligations to one another. In the writ- 
ings of both Peiper and Gilligan, despite their very dif- 
ferent objectives, can be found the basis for the thesis 
that individuals are interconnected and that these indi- 
vidual relationships play a primary role in the develop- 
ment of the concept of moral responsibility. The notion 
of moral obligation is seen as extending beyond the self 
to others, both in Pieper's concept of ~commutative jus- 
tice" and Gilligan's "ethic of care ~. This "ethic of care," 
as it is labeled in feminist ethics, is more than a mere 
"non-interference ethic." Rather, it is concerned with 
"what is above and beyond the floor of duty"(Held, 1995). 
Based on the belief that care and justice are part of the 
same moral framework, it has been aargued that individu- 
als have a moral obligation to assist others and to prevent 
harm. From this perspective, individuals would be com- 
pelled to act from a basis of moral obligation, even though 
there may be no specific laws or rules to prescribe such 
actions. 
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Anton Vedder (2001) has recently put forth a theory of 
moral obligation that also has implications at the level of 
the individual. From Vedder's view, it would seem to 
follow that we cannot excuse ourselves from our moral 
responsibility to inform the victim of a threat to his/her 
life simply because there is no specific law obligating us 
to do so. Vedder asserts that "the sheer ability and op- 
portunity to act in order to avoid or prevent harm, dan- 
ger, and offense from taking place" puts an obligation on 
the agent. We saw in the preceding section how Vedder's 
argument can be applied to issues of moral responsibil- 
ity involving organizations. He also points out that in 
cases "when harm, danger or offense would be consider- 
able while the appropriate action would not present sig- 
nificant risks, costs or burdens to the agent," the same 
not ion of moral responsibil ity applies, regardless of  
whether the agent is a natural person or an organization 
(Vedder, 2001). 
5.1 A Minimalist Sense of Moral 
Ob l igat ion  
Some have argued that while morality can demand of an 
agent that he or she "do no harm" to others, it cannot 
require the agent to actively "prevent harm" or "do good." 
In one sense, to do no harm is to act in accordance with 
moral obligation. But is doing so always sufficient for 
complying with what is required of us as moral agents? 
In other words, if it is in our power to prevent harm and 
to do good, should we always be required to do so? And, 
if the answer to this question is yes, what are the grounds 
for such a theory of obligation. 
There are a number of theoretical perspectives that would 
support the view that individuals should prevent harm 
(and otherwise do good) whenever it is in their power to 
do so. For example, if one believes, as some natural law 
theorists assert, that the purpose of morality is to allevi- 
ate human suffering and to promote human flourishing, 
whenever possible, then dearly we would seem obligated 
to prevent harm in cyberspace. For an interesting account 
of this type of moral theory, see Louis Pojman (2001). 
Unfortunately, we are not able to develop Pojman's argu- 
ment here, since doing so would take us beyond the scope 
of this paper. But we can at least now see how, based on 
a model like Pojman's, one might develop a fuller theory 
in which individuals have an obligation to prevent harm 
or a "duty to assist." Of  course, we recognize the difficul- 
ties of defending a natural law theory; and we are not 
prepared to do so here. However, we also believe that the 
kind of limited or "moderate" natural law theories that 
can be found in Pojman, and to some extent in James 
Moor (1998), can be very useful in making the case for 
individual moral obligation. 
5.2 Expanding the Sphere of Moral  
Obl igat ion:  The Duty  to Ass i s t  
Questions involving one's ~duty to assist" received con- 
siderable attention in the notorious Kitty Genovese case 
in 1964. Genovese was a young woman who was mur- 
dered on her street in Queens, New York, as thirty-eight 
of her neighbors watched. They did not call the police 
during the 35-minute period of repeated stabbings. This 
refusal to assist has since become known as "the Genovese 
Syndrome" (Dorman). Police involved in the Genovese 
case stated that they believed that even though there was 
no formal law or specific statute requiring people who 
saw the crime to call the police, these witnesses were 
nonetheless morally obligated to do so. 
We can draw an analogy between the Genovese case and 
the Boyer case. The world of cyberspace with its atten- 
dant anonymity makes it easy for those who wish to avoid 
a duty to assist. But, what will cyberspace become, if 
people do not take their moral obligations eriously? Is 
our obligation merely to do no harm? Pieper, Gilligan 
and Vedder would answer no. We can see that balancing 
thc harm that could come from doing nothing, which 
would cause considerable danger to the victim, against 
the level of inconvenience aused to self, which would be 
minimal, is yet another motivation for Internet users to 
assist. In the case of Barber and Ddlapenta, Barber's fa- 
ther with the cooperation of the men who were soliciting 
her, provided evidence that led to Ddlapenta's arrest. In 
the case of Amy Boyer, however, the sense of individual 
moral responsibility was not apparent since certain online 
users had indeed viewed the Youens' Web site and did 
not inform Amy Boyer that she was being stalked. As in 
the case of Kitty Genovese, Boyer was also murdered. 
Was Boyer's death an online manifestat ion of  the 
"Genovese syndrome?" 
In light of what happened to Amy Boyer, we suggest 
that online users adopt a notion of individual responsi- 
bility to assist others. Doing so would help to keep 
cyberspace a safer place for everyone, but especially those 
who are particularly vulnerable: women and children. 
One might argue that, the threat to Boyer was virtual 
J i.e., since the threat was not in physical space, it 
need not have been taken seriously. To accept his argu- 
ment, we would have to assume that no threats in 
cyberspace have ever resulted in harm to or in the death 
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of the victim. Of course, there have been many cases of 
stalking, including the Boyer and Barber cases, as well 
as instances of pedophilia, that have resulted in physical 
harm to individuals. In avoiding our individual duty to 
assist, individual users disconnect themselves from their 
responsibility towards fellow human beings. When we 
accept he duty to assist, we are acknowledging our moral 
obligation to help prevent others from being harmed. 
the chief investigator in the Amy Boyer cyberstalking 
case, for some helpful information that he provided dur- 
ing an interview with him. 
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